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THE ILLINOIS DEAD MAN'S STATUTE-ITS EFFECT
ON THE PERSONAL INJURY TRIAL
BERNARD W. MOLTZ*LE numerous other jurisdictions, Illinois has adopted a statute
which provides for the protection of parties who are suing or
being sued as representatives, heirs, devisees or legatees for de-
cedents. This statute has been denominated as the "Dead Man's Act."1
The statute provides that no party to a lawsuit shall be permitted to
testify on his own Motion or behalf, when any adverse party is suing
or defending in a representative capacity as an executor, administra-
* MR. MOLTz received his LL.B. degree from John Marshall Law School, in 1960. He
is a member of the Illinois State Bar Association, and an associate in the firm of Rosen-
gard and Hecht.
1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 2 (1965). No party to any civil action suit or proceeding, or
person directly interested in the event thereof, shall be allowed to testify therein of his
own Motion, or in his own behalf, by virtue of the foregoing section, when any adverse
party sues or defends as a Trustee or Conservator of any habitual drunkard, or person
who is mentally ill or mental deficient, or as the executor, administrator, heir, legatee
or devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian or trustee of any such heir, legatee or
devisee, unless when called as a witness by such adverse party so suing or defending,
and also except in the following cases, namely:
First-In such action, suit or proceeding, a party or interested person may testify
to facts occurring after the death of such deceased person, or after the ward, heir,
legatee or devisee shall have attained his or her majority.
Second-When, in such action, suit or proceeding, any agent of any deceased person
shall, in behalf of any person or persons suing or being sued, in either of the capacities
above named, testify to any conversation or transaction between such agent and the
opposite party or party in interest, such opposite party or party in interest, may testify
concerning the same conversation or transaction.
Third-Where, in any such action, suit or proceeding, any such party suing or de-
fending, as aforesaid, or any persons having a direct interest in the event of such action,
suit or proceeding, shall testify in behalf of such party so suing or defending, to any
conversation or transaction with the opposite party or party in interest, then such
opposite party or party in interest, shall also be permitted to testify as to the same
conversation or transaction.
Fourth-Where, in any such action, suit or proceeding, any witness, not a party
to the record, or not a party in interest, or not an agent of such deceased person,
shall, in behalf of any party to such action, suit or proceeding, testify to any conversa-
tion or admission by any adverse party or party in interest, occurring before the death
and in the absence of such deceased person, such adverse party or party in interest
may also testify as to the same admission or conversation.
Fifth-When in any such action, suit or proceeding, the deposition of such deceased
person shall be read in evidence at the trial, any adverse party or party in interest may
testify as to all matters and things testified to in such deposition by such deceased
person, and not excluded for irrelevancy or incompetency.
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tor, heir, legatee or devisee for a decedent, unless called upon to
testify by the protected party.
The statute contains five exceptions to the preceding general rule.
First, a party may testify with regard to facts occurring subsequent to
the death of the decedent. Second, when any agent of such deceased
or incompetent person shall testify regarding any conversation or
transaction between such agent and the party ordinarily barred from
testifying, then, the party so barred may testify concerning the same
conversation or transaction. Third, when any party who has an in-
terest in the litigation shall testify on behalf of the party who is pro-
tected by the statute, then, the party who would ordinarily be re-
stricted from testifying may under such circumstances testify regard-
ing the same conversation or transaction. Fourth, when any party
who is not a litigant, or a party in interest, nor the agent of the pro-
tected party, shall on behalf of the protected party testify to a con-
versation or transaction by the restricted party, occurring prior to the
death of and in the absence of the decedent, then, the party who
would ordinarily be barred from testifying may likewise testify to
the same conversation or transaction. Fifth, when the deposition of
the deceased person shall be read into evidence at trial, then, the re-
stricted party may testify regarding all matters contained in such
deposition as were admissible into evidence.
Many works on this statute have been quick to point out the gross
inequities that its operation is capable of perpetrating. This author
fully recognizes such shortcomings of the "Dead Man's Act," and
certainly does not undertake to condone or justify them. However,
it is worthwhile to consider that in the past, the Illinois Courts on
numerous occasions have endeavored to define the purposes and spirit
of this statute. The courts have seen as the purpose of the "Dead
Man's Act," the protection of the estates of decedents against fraud-
ulent claims,2 the assistance to executors and administrators of de-
cedent estates who are unable to produce evidence to rebut the testi-
mony of living parties making adverse claims against decedent estate
and thereby to place all party litigants in such matters on an equal
footing,8 and the prevention of temptation to commit perjury.4
2 Friederich v. Wolf, 383 Ii. 638, 50 N.E.2d 755 (1943).
8 Combs v. Younge, 281 Ill. App. 339 (1935); Rouse v. Tomasek, 279 Ill. App. 557
(1935).
4 Redden v. Inman, 6 111. App. 55 (1880).
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Although some of the foregoing interpretations are unacceptable
to many attorneys, the "Dead Man's Act," despite agitation for its
abolition, nevertheless remains a very real part of Illinois law. Further-
more, with the ever present backlog of personal injury lawsuits on
most court calendars, the "Dead Man's Act" presents some very real
and oftentimes troublesome problems to the trial advocate engaged in
either the prosecution or defense of personal injury cases. The pur-
pose of this work shall be to explore some of the common factual situa-
tions arising under circumstances wherein the "Dead Man's Act" is
applicable and, hopefully, to develop some feasible solutions.
The primary consideration for the attorney involved in litigation
wherein there has been the death or incapacity of one of the party
litigants is to ascertain those parties whose testimony is rendered in-
competent by operation of the "Dead Man's Statute" and to ascer-
tain a means of proving his case in the light of such incompetency.
One of the more common fact situations involves a deceased plain-
tiff suing surviving joint tortfeasors who are principal and agent.
The principal's liability is passive under the theory of 'respondeat
superior' and the agent's liability is active. If there has been no sever-
ance of trial against both defendants, the defendant agent would be
incompetent to testify at a joint trial.' Here the prudent course of pro-
cedure for the defense would be severance of trial between the de-
fendants. Consequently, at the trial of the defendant principal alone,
the agent would be a competent witness.6 Failure by the defense to
accomplish such severance results in the parties standing trial as co-
defendants, with the defendant agent who is generally the operator
of the defendant principal's vehicle being incompetent to testify. 7
On the other hand, the prudent course for the prosecution would be
to join the defendant driver/agent, name him as a party defendant
and serve him with process.
Failure to serve the driver/agent will destroy his standing as a party
to the litigation and will thereby render him competent to testify even
though he may be named party defendant in the complaint.8 Where
the defendant agent has been made a party, an offer by him to waive
any personal benefit from his testimony and to testify solely on behalf
5 Blachek v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 311 111. App. 1, 35 N.E.2d 416 (1941).
6 Ibid.; Feitl v. Chicago City Ry., 211 111. 279, 71 N.E. 991 (1904).
7 Hann v. Brooks, 331 I11. App. 535, 73 N.E.2d 624 (1947).
8 Sankey v. Interstate Dispatch, 339 111. App. 420,90 N.E.2d 265 (1950).
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of the co-defendant principal will not be effective in avoiding the
statutory prohibition against such testimony. 9
One of the more interesting developments of the principal-agent
situations occurs where the principal and agent both as co-defendants
are found guilty. Should the agent never appeal from the judgment
and verdict, while the principal, on the other hand, does appeal, and
the Appellate Court reverses the judgment and verdict as to the prin-
cipal only and remands the cause for a new trial as to this party only,
the agent would not be considered an interested party in the new
trial and would be competent to testify therein.' °
Consequently, we may observe that in dealing with the situation
of co-defendant principal and agent defending a claim brought by
the administrator or executor of the estate of a deceased plaintiff,
the tenor of the decisions would dictate to the prosecution to be dili-
gent in joining and prosecuting the principal and agents as joint tort-
feasors, being especially vigilant that proper service of process has
been made upon all party defendants. Conversely, the defense in such
situations should be geared toward a severance of the trial of the
defendants.
Illinois Courts have on numerous occasions undertaken to define
the nature of an interest that will act to disqualify a party from testify-
ing by operation of the "Dead Man's Act." The test generally adopted
is whether a party will gain or lose as a direct result of the lawsuit."
The disqualifying interest must be actual and not based upon belief,
theory,'2 or future speculation." The interest must be such that pe-
cuniary gain or loss of the party will be directly and immediately
affected by the judgment. Any lesser interest will not bar the testi-
mony but merely goes to its creditability.14
Stockholders in corporations that are parties to lawsuits have been
found not to have so connected an interest in the litigation as to be
barred from testifying. 5 The mother and wife, respectively, of two
9 Sullivan v. Corn Products Ref. Co., 245 111.9,91 N.E. 643 (1910).
10 Vebb v. Willett Co., 309 Ill. App. 504,33 N.E.2d 636 (1941).
11 Brownlie v. Brownlie, 351 Ill. 72, 183 N.E. 613 (1932).
12Latham v. Rishel, 384 111. 478, 51 N.E.2d 531 (1943); Allen v. North, 271 I11. 190,
110 N.E. 1027 (1915).
13 Hughes v. Williams, 300 I11. App. 108, 20 N.E.2d 860 (1939).
14 Spencer v. Wilsey, 330 I11. App. 439, 71 N.E.2d 804 (1947).
15 Anthoney Itner Buick Co. v. Ashby, 198 I1l. 562, 64 N.E. 1109 (1902); National
Woodenware & Copperage v. Smith, 108 Ill. App. 777 (1903).
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joint defendants have been held incompetent to testify. 16 The courts
have gone so far as to hold wives incompetent to testify even where
they become divorced from a party during the pendency of the liti-
gation.17 A party who is a next friend to a minor involved in the
litigation remains disqualified from testifying as long as he retains the
status of next friend. However, upon the minor attaining majority
and the removal of the next friend as a named party to the litigation,
the next friend's previous disqualification to testify ceases. 8
In wrongful death actions, the defendant motorist, in the absence
of circumstances constituting a waiver of the protection of the statute,
has been held incompetent to testify. 9 Even in situations wherein the
decedent and the surviving defendant were the sole occupants of an
automobile, the surviving defendant was barred from testifying by
the statute.20 Parties to an accident who as a result of their participa-
tion in the accident are deemed by the Court to have a sufficient and
direct interest in the result of the litigation will be disqualified from
testifying.2
The "Dead Man's Act" likewise operates to curtail the testimony
of surviving personal injury plaintiffs. Joint plaintiffs each claiming
against the estate of a deceased defendant will be incompetent to tes-
tify on each other's behalf so long as their actions remain unsevered.22
The intelligent alternative would be for the co-plaintiffs to maintain
separate lawsuits. Conversely, the defense should seek a consolidation
of such actions on the basis that they arise from a similar occurrence
and involve similar parties.
A plaintiff suing a corporate defendant and their deceased agent as
joint tortfeasors would ordinarily be incompetent under the statute
to testify in his own behalf. This incompetency may be alleviated
by the dismissal of the deceased agent as a party defendant or by
having the jury appropriately instructed that the plaintiff's testimony
is admissible as limited solely to the liability of the principal corporate
defendant. 3
16De May v. Brew, 306 Ill. App. 505, 29 N.E.2d 114 (1940).
17 Supra note 7.
18 Freeman v. Easeley, 117 Ill. 317, 7 N.E. 656 (1886).
19 Countryman v. Sullivan, 344 111. App. 371, 100 N.E.2d 799 (1951).
20 Robinson v. Workman, 7 Ill. App. 2d 42, 129 N.E.2d 32 (1955).
21 Mernick v. Chiodini, 12 Il. App. 2d 249, 139 N.E.2d 784 (1956).
22 Braun v. Lawder, 344 111. App. 423, 100 N.E.2d 348 (1951).
23 Clark v. A. Bazzoni & Co., 7 Ill. App. 2d 334, 129 N.E.2d 435 (1955).
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Counsel for protected parties must be vigilant regarding the tender
by the opposition of testimony that is incompetent under the statute
because the operation of the "Dead Man's Act" is not automatic. A
timely and specific objection to the proffered testimony must be
made at the trial level or any objection will be considered waived.24
On the other hand, counsel for the incompetent party should at least
endeavor to call his witness in jury trials because there always exists
the hopeful possibility that no objection to the competency of the
witness will be made. Even in the event of objection, the jury has
had the opportunity to observe that the witness was willing to testify
yet was prevented from so doing. This technique coupled with an
appropriately illuminating instruction at the conclusion of the trial2"
will go far toward apprizing the jury of the disadvantage encountered
by a surviving party litigant.
The calling of the incompetent party to testify by the protected
party is effective in partially relieving such incompetency to testify.
Illinois, however, is particularly conservative on this proposition and
has been known to subscribe to the 'Half Open Door Rule.' Under
this rule the incompetency of the witness is lifted only as to matters
upon which he was interrogated by the other party 2
This provision has the potential of enabling the protected party to
use an otherwise incompetent party's testimony to his best interest
without endangering his own position. Consider the situation of a
wrongful death claim against co-defendants who are sued as principal
and agent wherein the issue of agency is disputed. The alleged agent
can be called to testify regarding solely the issue of agency without
any fear that such testimony would render this witness competent to
testify regarding the issue of liability.17 Another effective use of the
'half open door rule' is the calling by the protected party of an
otherwise incompetent party as an adverse witness,28 making a singular
query which this party must answer in a particular manner and there-
upon impeaching said witness with a contrary inconsistent statement
24Weinstein v. Morris, 281 I1. App. 12 (1935); Becker v. Foster, 64 Ill. App. 192
(1896). /
25 ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 5.01-.06 (1961).
26 Perkins v. Brown, 400 111. 490, 81 N.E.2d 207 (1948).
27 Hann v. Brooks, supra note 7; Blumb v. Getz, 294 11. App. 432, 13 N.E.2d 1019
(1938).
28 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 60 (1965).
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made by him in a prior deposition..2 This will only operate to allow
the impeached party to testify as to those portions of the depositions
as might tend to explain the impeaching portion.30 The 'half open
door theory' also can be useful to a protected party for the limited
purpose of questioning the incompetent party concerning the descrip-
tion of his vehicle and the identification of the parties with him at
the time of the occurrence. "1 This is especially effective in establishing
the defective nature of the incompetent party's vehicle and to lessen
the impact of impartial witnesses called by the incompetent party to
testify if it can be shown that the incompetent party was unaware
of the presence of such witnesses at the scene of the accident at the
time and place when it happened.
As a caveat to trial counsel attempting to glean a maximum advan-
tage from the 'half open door theory' great care must be taken not
to question the incompetent party too fully. Once inquiry has been
made into various aspects of negligence under adverse examination,
the door is opened, and the otherwise incompetent party may be
further examined by his counsel regarding the negligent conduct of
the deceased party. 2 Likewise, a proffer by the protected party to
read into evidence portions of the incompetent party's deposition will
constitute a waiver of the incompetent party's restriction against testi-
fying and will enable the latter to testify regarding the entire trans-
action.33
Where one of the co-defendants is deceased and represented by
an administrator or executor at trial, there is the danger that an other-
wise incompetent plaintiff will be allowed to testify if the surviving
defendant takes the witness stand and testifies regarding the occur-
rence.34 Clearly, the plaintiff's counsel in this situation must strive to
present a sufficiently potent case that will coax the surviving defend-
ant into testifying, thereby waiving the protection of the "Dead Man's
Statute" and enabling the plaintiff to testify as to his version. These
tactics are applicable only where the interests of the co-defendants
are similar. Where the interests of the co-defendants are adverse at the
29 De Young v. Ralley, 329 111. App. 1, 67 N.E.2d 221 (1946).
30 Ibid.
31 Washington v. Peterson, 320 111. App. 140, 49 N.E.2d 883 (1943).
32 Combs v. Younge, supra note 3.
33 In re Hershon's Estate, 329 Il. App. 328, 68 N.E.2d 482 (1946).
34 Beebe v. Workman, 336 111. App. 1, 82 N.E.2d 701 (1948).
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time of occurrence and at the time of trial, the testimony of a surviving
co-defendant will be barred by the "Dead Man's Statute."35
It is virtually elementary that the plaintiff in a personal injury, as
in any other type of lawsuit, has the burden of proceeding and must
make out at least a prima facie case or face the undesirable alternative
of a directed verdict against him. Conversely, the defendant against
whom a prima facie case has been made likewise has the burden of
introducing sufficient rebutting evidence or face a verdict directed
against him. Under these circumstances it is clear that the protected
party under the "Dead Man's Statute" will most likely be required to
introduce some evidence. The introduction of such evidence will in
the appropriate situation unseal the lips of an otherwise incompetent
party under the statute.
Where the plaintiff is deceased, the testimony of an occurrence
witness such as a close relative of the plaintiff regarding the occur-
rence will be effective to open the door and allow the defendant to
testify. 6 Nevertheless, such testimony lifts the statutory prohibition
only as to the transaction testified to on behalf of the protected party.
It does not operate to enable the protected party to testify concerning
such transactions which were not covered in the witness' testimony. 7
Although a litigant may have been present at the time and place of
the occurrence which is the subject of the lawsuit, the mere fact that
he is a party in interest bars his testimony. 8 On the other hand, an
independent witness who is neither a litigant nor a party in interest
will never be prohibited from testifying. A litigant or one having an
interest in the litigation whose testimony has been rendered incom-
petent by the statute cannot make himself competent to testify by
calling a witness, interrogating said witness upon a particular issue and,
thereafter, seeking to testify himself, regarding this issue.39 Thus, the
prudent protected party should never call an interested witness whose
interests are aligned with the protected party to testify unless such
testimony is necessary to meet the burden of proof or disproof.
Conversations involving the incompetent party that is incompetent
to testify appear to be a peculiar characteristic of lawsuits involving
35 Elwell v. Hicks, 238 I11. 170,87 N.E. 316 (1909).
36 Van Meter v. Goldfarb, 317 111. 620, 148 N.E. 391 (1925).
37 Calkins v. Calkins, 220 Il. 111, 77 N.E. 102 (1906).
38 Ogden v. Keck, 253 Il. App. 444 (1929).
39 Johnson v. McKnight, 313 111. App. 260, 39 N.E.2d 700 (1942).
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the "Dead Man's Act." Where the conversation occurred in the pres-
ence of the decedent, the testimony of witnesses as to this conversation
will not render the incompetent party competent. 40 On the other
hand, where the conversation occurred in the absence of the decedent,
as is frequently the situation at the scene of a wrongful death accident,
then testimony regarding a conversation with the incompetent party
will operate to relieve the prohibition against him with respect to that
conversation and to the facts reasonably pertinent to it.41 The prosecu-
tion must be very cautious in considering whether to have a witness
testify as to such a conversation and should resort to such testimony
only when necessary to sustain the burden of proving their case or
rebutting that of the opposition.
There will always be the situation of trial counsel and the court
being in disagreement as to the law governing the procedure of the
trial. Disagreement as to the law governing trial procedure will arise
regarding the proposition of whether the testimony of a proffered
witness is or is not barred by the "Dead Man's Statute." Upon receiv-
ing an adverse ruling, counsel should make careful objections for the
purpose of properly preserving the appellate record. After doing so
the counsel should not sit by idly and merely observe the testimony
of the disputed witness. Such a witness should be carefully cross
examined in light of the testimony rendered and with reference to
the particular trial situation. Such cross examination and interrogation
of the witness will not operate as a waiver of the objection as to his
competency to testify. 2
With respect to incompetency based upon interest in the lawsuit,
we may once again consider the hypothetical arrangement of a plain-
tiff claiming against two or more defendants where one of the defend-
ants being deceased is protected under the "Dead Man's Act." Where
the interests of the defendants are adverse both the plaintiff and sur-
viving defendant are per se incompetent to testify. Plaintiffs' counsel
under these circumstances should carefully consider which defend-
ant's liability is stronger and more manifest. Where the liability against
the deceased defendant is the stronger, the plaintiff might be wise in
dropping his claim against the living defendant, thereby rendering
40 Ruckrnan v. Alwood, 71111. 155 (1873).
41 Judy v. Judy, 261 Ill. 470, 104 N.E. 256 (1914); Crow v. Blaser, 335 111. App. 281,
81 N.E.2d 742 (1948).
42 Lotta v. Lotta, 6 111. 2d 397, 129 N.E.2d 153 (1955).
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this party competent to testify as a witness for proving the liability
of the deceased defendant.43 Conversely, where liability is stronger
against the living defendant, it would appear that the wisest course
for the plaintiff would be to dismiss his claim against the deceased
defendant and proceed solely against the surviving defendant, thereby
obviating any restrictions of the "Dead Man's Act." However, any
benefit derived by the plaintiff from this technique can be nullified
by an alert surviving defendant who impleads the estate of the de-
ceased defendant back into the lawsuit and by so doing revives the
applicability of the "Dead Man's Act."
We are living in an age where large scale and liberal discovery
procedures are the rule. Depositions have become the mainstay, if not
at the very least an integral part of such discovery framework. Let
us next consider the applicability of depositions to the trial situation
involving the "Dead Man's Act."
At first blush, it would appear that once litigation has commenced,
especially in our present age of large backlogs in most court calendars,
every party to litigation should be zealous in having his deposition
taken and appropriately filed with the court for use in evidence in the
event that his opponent should die or become incapacitated in any
of the manners described in the statute. As salutary as the above pro-
cedure may appear to be, it unfortunately is not always effective.
For instance, the decisions have held that depositions taken while the
suit is pending are not to be considered at trial where the adverse
party died subsequent to the taking of the deposition yet prior to the
time of trial. This is true even where, as in the case of an evidence
deposition where the deposition transcript was filed with the clerk of
the court, 44 yet the deponent was not cross examined by opposing
counsel.45
However, an evidence deposition may always be considered in evi-
dence regarding matters which occurred subsequent to the death of
the protected party.46
The protected party must be most wary with regard to the intro-
duction of the incompetent party's deposition into evidence. Such
43 Kleinhans v. Ohde, 350 Ill. App. 177, 112 N.E.2d 498 (1953); Wuebbles v. Shea,
294 Ill. App. 157, 13 N.E.2d 646 (1938).
44 Smith v. Billings, 177 111. 446, 53 N.E. 81 (1898).
45 Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 325 11. App. 459,60 N.E.2d 560 (1945).
4 6 Bogart v. Brazee, 331 1. 160, 162 N.E. 877 (1928).
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an introduction into evidence would operate toward waiving the
protection of the statute. 47
Similarly when the estate of a protected party has introduced into
evidence any deposition of the incompetent party whose testimony
was previously restricted by the statute, the protected party by so do-
ing lifts the incompetency of such party to testify. 8 The inherent
danger of introducing depositions is manifest and should be resorted to
only when absolutely necessary under the circumstances. Counsel who
undertakes to have depositions read into evidence should be further
aware that the lifting of such incompetency by the adverse party
operates not merely to testifying as a mere denial of the statements in-
cluded in the deposition, but enables the otherwise incompetent party
to testify as to all circumstances included in said deposition, to the
fullest extent of his knowledge."
Where the circumstances are such that the protected party's dep-
osition although taken and filed with the court, but where there was
no cross-examination of the deponent by opposing counsel, the in-
competent party cannot remove his incompetency by the introduction
of such a deposition into evidence." This rule applies likewise to
surviving adverse party defendants as well as to the surviving party
plaintiff where one of the co-defendants died prior to trial.51
Finally, before departing from this phase of the topic, it is worth-
while to consider the situation of a deceased defendant who has left
behind him a self-serving evidence deposition. The substance of this
deposition will not of itself in any way assist the surviving plaintiff in
making out a prima facie case, nor can it be used to lift the surviving
plaintiff's incompetency to testify in his own behalf. The estate of the
defendant under these circumstances is at least temporarily in the
enviable position of adopting a wait and see attitude until it has ascer-
tained whether the plaintiff will be able to present a prima facie case.
If such prima facie case is presented by the plaintiff, then the estate
of the defendant could thereupon introduce into evidence the deposi-
tion of the deceased defendant. Although this technique will lift the
incompetency of the plaintiff to testify in rebuttal, it will under the
47 In re Hershon's Estate, supra note 33; Turner v. Lee, 254 111. 141, 98 N.E. 246 (1912).
48 De Costa v. Bischer, 287 11. 598, 122 N.E. 819 (1919).
49 Eastman v. United Marble Co., 224 Ill. App. 256 (1922).
50 Doggett v. Greene, 254 Ill. 134, 98 N.E. 219 (1912).
51 Ibid.
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circumstances operate to save the defendant's estate from having a
verdict directed against him and thereby enable him to have this
matter go to the trier of fact for determination upon the merits of
the controversy.
As noted earlier, the essential purpose of this work is not to criti-
cize the "Dead Man's Act." Nevertheless, a candid study and consid-
eration of this statute patently reveals some of its basic shortcomings
especially when viewed in the light of its effect upon the personal
injury trial. The niceties in the decisions which seek to justify the
statute and establish a rational basis for its continued existence never
go any further than to view it as a statute enacted for the purpose
of protecting estates from claims based upon testimony which they
are unable to rebut. This rationale of placing all parties on an equal
footing remains sound and just, so long as impartial witnesses
are available to testify who have no personal interest in the litigation.
Every practitioner who has encountered any amount of personal in-
jury litigation is strongly aware that the presence and existence of
such witnesses is not the general rule. In situations where the "Dead
Man's Act" is applicable and where there exist no impartial disinter-
ested witnesses the statute no longer operates as a shield to protect
helpless estates, but moves in the nature of a sword to cut off legiti-
mate claims.
In factual situations where the "Dead Man's Act" applies, the true
problem facing the personal injury plaintiff is the issue of liability;
the imperative and vital need of presenting sufficient evidence to
create a prima facie case and avoid a directed verdict of not guilty.
Proof of damage is basically unaffected by the statute because where
a defendant has died prior to trial, the surviving plaintiff can testify
regarding his own physical condition at trial time.2 In the same man-
ner, doctors are competent to testify regarding treatment rendered
and costs assessed therefor, employers may testify as to lost time and
mechanics may testify concerning property damage. Thus, a plaintiff
who has successfully met the liability hurdle is not usually restricted
by the statute regarding a showing of his special damages and the
amount of present pain and suffering. Nevertheless, we must never
lose sight of the fact that the true problem facing the claimant is that
of liability. One of the greatest hardships wrought by the "Dead
52 Heil v. Kastengren, 328 Il1. App. 301, 65 N.E.2d 579 (1946); Bogart v. Brazee,
supra note 46.
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Man's Act," will occur where the defendant is dead, the plaintiff
survives and there are no impartial eye witnesses to testify. Here the
act will operate to seal the plaintiff's lips and bar his testimony regard-
ing the facts of the occurrence.53 As a result of such incompetency
to testify, the plaintiff's cause of action faces a virtually mandatory
directed verdict of 'not guilty.' Thus we may very well have a per-
sonal injury claimant, who may have sustained very serious and dis-
abling injuries out of an occurrence wherein the issues of liability are
decidedly in his favor, being denied his rightful recovery for no other
reason than the fact that the tortfeasor responsible has died prior to
the time of trial.
The above illustration shows an urgent need for some legislative
modification that would operate to lift the incompetency of the plain-
tiff in this factual situation.
Conversely, it can be meritoriously argued on behalf of the defense
that an undeserving plaintiff could recover from the estate of the
deceased defendant if the plaintiff's incompetency to testify were to
be removed.
However, the overall justice that would be accomplished as a result
of the proposed legislative modification of the "Dead Man's Act" would
justify any minor setbacks to the defense. The defense would still
be protected in that the plaintiff although his lips are unsealed must
still by his testimony make out a prima facie case. The defense would
likewise still have full opportunity to cross examine the plaintiff and
to recall him to the witness stand as an adverse witness,54 in an effort
to bring out any inaccuracies or impeach his testimony. Furthermore,
the defense, in our age of liberal discovery wherein depositions of
doctors, employers and various other persons having a knowledge of
a plaintiff's damages, are readily available coupled with the opportu-
nity of having a plaintiff examined by a physician of the defendant's
choosing,55 would not be at any real disadvantage at trial with respect
to the issues of damages.
Although it may be argued that a plaintiff in the absence of the pro-
posed modification could conceivably make out a prima facie case by
use of careful habit evidence, such evidence may often times have very
slight practical application to the issues of the particular case and the
53 Ruspartini v. Steffeek, 414 11. 70, 110 N.E.2d 198 (1953).
54 Supra note 28.
55 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 101, § 17 (1965).
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court in the exercise of judicial discretion may deem such evidence
insufficient to have created a prima facie case.
Therefore, the lifting of the incompetency of a surviving personal
injury plaintiff to testify against an estate of a deceased defendant
where there are no impartial disinterested witnesses operates to enable
a trier of fact to at least hear testimony regarding the controversy
which is in litigation and to have some evidentiary basis for determin-
ing the rights of the parties instead of being forced to direct a verdict
of 'not guilty' without first hearing a scintilla of evidence as to the
merits of the controversy.
Under the existing Act, the estate of a deceased plaintiff may in-
troduce evidence showing the careful habits of the decedent in order
to prove the liability of the surviving defendant."6 Where the surviv-
ing defendant is the only eyewitness to the occurrence, he cannot
avoid the introduction of careful habits evidence by offering himself
as a witness to the prosecution.57 The careful habits of the decedent
without more has been held sufficient to create a prima facie case of
liability, thereby leaving the matter for ultimate determination by a
trier of fact.58 The plaintiff under these circumstances should likewise
take care to see that the jury is appropriately instructed that they
must consider the careful habits of the decedent in making their
decision. Failure by the court under these circumstances to use such
a proffered instruction constitutes reversible error.5 9
Although 'careful habit' evidence is effective at times toward creat-
ing a prima facie case on behalf of the deceased party's estate, it cer-
tainly is not the strongest evidence. The very nature of such evidence
operates to give the defense the opportunity to argue that the decedent
was acting in a careful and prudent manner at the time of the accident,
i.e. the introduction of such evidence operates towards removal of any
incompetency by the surviving defendant.60
The defense by tendering an impartial witness may, if such a wit-
ness exists, cause all testimony and evidence regarding careful habits
of the decedent to be struck from the record. 6' Clearly, such occur-
5 6 Zeller v. Durham, 33 111. App. 2d 273, 179 N.E.2d 34 (1962); Hurley v. Tipton,
46 Il. App. 2d 127, 196 N.E.2d 399 (1964).
57 Nordman v. Carlson, 291 Il1. App. 438, 10 N.E.2d 53 (1937).
58 Ibid. 59 Zeller v. Durham, supra note 56.
60 Hawthorne v. New York City R.R., 2 111. App. 2d 338, 119 N.E.2d 516 (1954).
61 Rouse v. Tomasek, 279 Ii. App. 557 (1935).
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rence or eyewitness testimony by the defense is more convincing
than the 'careful habits' evidence introduced by the prosecution and,
as a general rule, will give the defense some advantage.
The use of 'careful habit' testimony is not a fool proof means of
assuring a surviving plaintiff that he will be successful in making out
a prima facie case, and it is not a potent argument on behalf of the
defense against the previously proposed legislation that a surviving
plaintiff should be allowed to testify regarding liability when the
defendant is deceased and there are no impartial witnesses available.
For such evidence may often have slight practical application to the
issues of a particular case and the court in the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion may deem such evidence insufficient to have created a prima
facie case.
A perplexing problem for the estate of the deceased plaintiff will
arise when there is an impartial witness whose version of the occur-
rence favors the defense. The existence and proffering of such a wit-
ness by the defense, as noted earlier, renders inadmissible any 'careful
habit' testimony. Difficult as this problem may appear for the pros-
ecution, it is not altogether hopeless. The prosecution may under
these circumstances resort to the physical facts of the accident such
as the condition of the street where the accident took place, the
damage to the vehicles, their position after the accident, the position
of the decedent's body, skid marks and weather. Such evidence where
it is clearly presented and shows a reasonable basis regarding liability
will be effective toward creation of a prima facie case of liability.12
There is almost an endless number of factual situations which can
possibly develop wherein the "Dead Man's Act" would be applicable.
This in turn provides an affluent source of problems that the trial
advocate must effectively solve if he is to ultimately prevail. It would
be impractical to endeavor to conceive all such factual situations and
discuss them; therefore, only the more likely and frequent ones have
been considered. These problems indiscriminately affect both the
prosecution and the defense sides of personal injury litigation. Our
purpose has been to show through a thoughtful consideration of the
"Dead Man's Act" and the judicial decisions construing it, that a
majority of the restrictions manifested by the "Dead Man's Act" can
be overcome.
62 Supra note 57.
